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ABOUT THIS PAPER
This paper was originally presented by Professor Sam Moyo at the 5th African 
Forum of the “African Potentials” project organised at Addis Ababa from October 
31 to November 1, 2015. The “African Potentials” project is an international 
research endeavour funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 
(JSPS), of which Sam was an active member and a respected mentor.(1) The 
paper is an early version of the introductory chapter of What Colonialism 
Ignored: “African Potentials” for Resolving Conflicts in Southern Africa (edited 
by Sam Moyo & Yoichi Mine, Langaa RPCIG, 2016), a major posthumous 
work of Sam. At the time of the Addis Ababa Forum, we were still engaged 
in the rigorous co-writing of the introductory chapter by exchanging e-mails 
between Harare and Kyoto. Sam then took the lead in editing and reformatting 
the latest draft into this offshoot paper for the Forum.
I think this paper is especially meaningful in two ways. First, this version 
reflects the elements of the proposition of “African Potentials” that Sam wanted 
to emphasise in person (though he respected the part of my modest contribution). 
Second, the last section of this paper contains key initiatives that Sam crafted 
with care. To nurture and expand trans-regional research networks, he wanted 
to have these six-point initiatives widely discussed by the next generation African 
scholars and Japanese/Asian Africanists, and this is why I wanted to publish 
this version of our writing in African Study Monographs with only technical 
revisions.
Sadly, now, it is not possible to obtain Sam’s explicit agreement any 
more, but I have no doubt that he would be very happy that this document 
is presented to the public in this form. In the “African Potentials” fora, Sam 
enjoyed conversation with African and Asian anthropologists and sociologists 
who then highly appreciated Sam’s sharp political-economy interventions with 
his characteristic wide smile.
A luta continua!
Yoichi Mine
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INTRODUCTION
Narrow conceptual frameworks are often used to attribute violent conflicts to 
internal “dysfunction” and “barbarism” of African society. Yet, recently, the 
image of “rising Africa” has also become popular, given that the continent’s 
export of primary goods to the global markets has increased on a much larger 
scale, leading to markedly high growth rates. However, this conceptual framework 
is limited to a shallow causality of trade expansion, prosperity and stability. This 
said, Afro-optimism can easily be shattered, when the present extroverted 
development pattern proves to be unsustainable. While powers in global capitalism 
regard Africa as the land of opportunity, their interventions produce and aggravate 
contradictions across African society, leading to renewed pessimism.
Although the call for African solutions to African problems has given rise to 
various new initiatives when it comes to addressing violence and poverty, these 
efforts have not been sufficient. New geo-political imperatives shape the “scramble 
for Africa,” in which global capital acquires extraordinary shares of land and 
resources, as forms of trade, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) shift. New 
Asian investments diversify Africa’s international relations, gradually diminishing 
conventional Euro-American influence. This provides strategic opportunities to 
transform African societies, with their complex mix of diversity and commonality. 
The challenge for Africa is to release the potential of the people’s agency to 
solve Africa’s problems, transcending parochial identities and going beyond the 
dichotomy of “tradition/modernity.”
The “Southern African Potentials” Forum organised in Harare in 2012 sought 
to challenge and shift the centre of gravity away from Euro-American scholarship 
to deepen intellectual collaboration in an alternative “East-South” frame. It 
brought together scholars in history, anthropology, sociology and political 
economy and, through intensive debate, elaborated the notion of “African 
Potentials” to explore mechanisms that are utilised to bring about “conflict 
resolution and co-existence” in the African settings from below. The Forum 
discussed the nature of violent conflicts in contemporary Southern Africa, paying 
attention to the transformative dynamics of society and evaluating existing 
approaches for addressing conflicts, and sought an alternative vision called “African 
Potentials.” An academic book jointly written by African scholars and Japanese 
Africanists will be published as a result.
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONFLICT REGIME: VIOLENCE AND 
DISARTICULATION
Given that the Southern African conflict regime is complex, ambiguous and 
often paradoxical, it is proposed that its “Potentials” can only be realised when 
the structural violence embedded in global capitalism (as shaped by the 
settler-colonial trajectory) is addressed in fundamental ways. Structural 
violence in the Southern African countryside entails a unique accumulation 
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trajectory, as compared to the rest of the continent, although such trajectories 
seem to lead to a convergence. Elements of African Potentials are found in long 
historical processes: the historical mobility, flexibility and openness of African 
society. These elements contribute to the everyday practices that are a part of 
conflict resolution, which persist even today despite colonial and post-colonial 
distortions.
In 1994, South Africa’s transition to the African non-racial majority rule 
promised a peace dividend to the entire region. However, the South African 
transition could barely contain conflicting aspirations and emotions, including “tribal 
identities.” The social life of South African neoliberal cities is tormented by rampant 
crime, insecurities and growing inequalities, compared for instance to the relative 
calmness of everyday life in Harare, even though Zimbabwe is classified as a “failed 
state” by the Western powers. Yet, in the 2000s, relatively “stable” countries such 
as Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar continued to be affected by election-related 
violence.
Nevertheless, the GDP growth rates of Southern African countries surpassed 
5 percent on average during the first decade and a half of the 21st century, 
largely due to the rising demand for natural resources in Asian economies. 
However, the present growth, induced by the export of primary products, has 
precipitated renewed insecurity and vulnerability in African society. As the wealth 
is increasingly possessed by a handful of land and mineral “grabbing” barons 
around economic enclaves, frustration is fermenting among the alienated masses. 
Furthermore, the recent burst of the commodity bubble has sharply shrunk 
external resource flows, making the life of peasants and workers, as well as the 
positions of ruling classes, much more precarious.
The “New Scramble for Africa” is changing the landscape of the countryside 
as land concentration leads toward a convergence of historical trajectories of 
capital accumulation based on large-scale farming and transnational agribusiness. 
The rise of Sinophobia and Sinophilia is found almost everywhere in African 
countries, as Chinese goods, labour and capital are entrenched at an unprecedented 
rate. The fact, however, is that global monopoly capital, both Western and 
Eastern, capitalise on “investment opportunities” created by neoliberal policies 
to assert control over land and resources in Africa, and the entry of China is 
used to impose a renewed, orderly “partition” of Africa that is deemed to be 
more “equitable” for all external and internal capitalist speculators. This process 
constitutes the most significant setting for violent conflict and renewed geopolitical 
militarisation in Africa (Moyo et al., 2012).
Compared to the magnitude of human suffering in global human history, 
according to Julius Nyerere (2000: xiv): “the surprising thing is not that there 
has been so much political instability in Africa but that there has been so 
much stability, although this fact is less publicized internationally.” In the past 
quarter-century, however, parts of the relatively peaceful African countryside 
have been shaken successively by rebellious groups and armed rogues, alongside 
more disciplined attempts such as those in rural Zimbabwe to address the 
lingering colonial legacy.
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These conflicts are connected to imperialist forces, which increasingly 
control the land and resources and take advantage of internal strife among 
Africans. The continent is entering an age of precarious transition and dynamic 
change, and the focus of these struggles is in the countryside. Continuous 
external interventions and evolving contradictions make the future of Africa 
much more complicated and unpredictable, although the resilience of African 
peoples and states is evident. Strong undercurrents of social processes that 
mediate conflicts and enable transformation throughout recent history of Africa 
suggest that legitimate “African Potentials” will be able to transform African 
society.
THREE PREDOMINANT PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN CONFLICTS
The “African Potentials” Forum held at Harare discussed three predominant 
perspectives to understand the nature of violent confrontations. The first is the 
notion of Africa’s “backwardness,” which has been rife in the discourse of 
popular journalism as well as academic writings on Africa in the West. Within 
this framework, Africa is regarded as a continent of self-destruction, its society 
is intrinsically emotional, irrational and abusive since ancient times and will 
remain so forever. This perspective is buttressed by the theory of 
neopatrimonialism, a mainstream theoretical framework in African studies, 
based on the Weberian categorisation of human societies and the Eurocentric 
perception of the “otherness” of non-Western societies (see Bach & Gazibo, 
2012; Mkandawire, 2013). With few exceptions, most academic writings pursue 
this culturalist line of thought, whereby the essence of African society is 
considered timeless, unchangeable and incapable of creating a new order. If 
there is anything worth engaging with in Africa, it is the land, minerals and 
natural resources, not the people.
This reductionist cultural discourse obscures reality, reflecting a Malthusian 
fear of population explosion at the periphery of the global capitalist system. 
However, such fears also reflect the real frustration of the majority of the world’s 
population, who comprise a mass semi-proletariat living in the countryside and 
facing accelerated pauperisation and marginalisation. These are human persons 
enduring an ongoing process of enclosure and structural neglect. The current 
trajectory could lead to the genocide of half of humanity unless a democratic, 
labour-absorbing type of agricultural revolution firmly based on peasant 
production is pursued (Amin, 1990; 2011; Moyo & Yeros, 2005).
The second approach to addressing the African conflict discussed at the Forum 
involves the perspective of universal justice and human rights. Based on the 
flawed perception that local people are unable to realise post-conflict reconciliation 
by themselves, this approach seeks to implant universal principles from above. 
This is typically shown in the legal action taken by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which has largely prosecuted Africans. While the responsibility of 
some African political leaders for the gross violation of human rights is undeniable, 
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the practitioners of international laws and human rights seldom pay attention to 
the attempts at social healing taking place at village and street levels, despite 
the fact that most atrocities were committed at these local levels. This approach 
also absolves external actors which generate the structural injustices underlying 
these conflicts.
Another variation of this top-down approach involves constitutional engineering 
to contain political confrontations and emotions, such as power-sharing 
arrangements to “normalise” the war-town states. Although the arrangements 
can be negotiated by local politicians through the mediation of a regional 
organization, theorists of social engineering still tend to regard their 
prescriptions as one-size-fits-all recipes (Mine et al., 2013). To this end, Paul 
Collier comes up with an extreme proposal suggesting that the Western players 
should force undemocratic leaders of African governments to accept election 
results by threatening military intervention while trusting the “rational” behaviours 
of dictators (Collier, 2009).
In the realm of economics, the proposition of individual property rights 
propounded by Hernando de Soto has been favoured by the World Bank and 
has wielded influence over the policy making of national governments in Africa 
(Soto, 2000). Certain forms of justice, electoral democracy as well as the 
stabilization of land tenure system are all required for any government, but the 
problem is that most of these top-down attempts presuppose a convergence 
around an idealised Western liberal democracy, rather than developing hybrid 
systems accommodating local needs and participatory dynamics. South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and its experiments of “inclusive 
governments,” as well as other efforts at reconciliation, such as in Namibia 
(since 1990) and Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1990, fit into this latter mould to 
some extent.
Thirdly, a new “traditionalist” perspective was discussed, given that 
studies of history and anthropology have widely accepted that many of the 
seemingly “African” practices were “invented” under colonial power 
relations (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Mamdani, 2012). In post-colonial 
situations, there have been several attempts to realise conflict resolution and 
reconciliation at the societal level by resurrecting and reconstructing past practices 
of community justice through the “reinvention” of traditions. Attempts that have 
fully involved rural villagers include the Gacaca court in Rwanda, a community 
justice system established in 2001 to speed up the trial of the suspects of 
genocide crime (Clark, 2010). Aside from these formal experiments, traditional 
rituals were explicitly utilized as a method to heal the wounds of civil war at 
the village level in Mozambique (see also Hayner, 2001). Although these 
tradition-based practices of conflict resolution reflect bottom-up ingenuity, such 
institutions also have the risk of falling prey to post-colonial despots in the 
shadow of late colonial bifurcation of the “modern” world of urban citizens 
and the “traditional” world of rural peasants (Mamdani, 1996).
While the second universal approach and the third new traditionalist approach 
appear to be irreconcilable as opposites, in reality, they are embedded together 
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within the single space of post-colonial Africa. The contradiction of modernity 
and tradition is especially palpable in Southern Africa, where indigenous 
communities have been exposed for more than a century to the political and 
cultural influence of settler communities. Furthermore, in this region, the duality 
of colonial rulers has sometimes resulted in unintended consequences of 
strengthening the practice of “divide and rule,” as demonstrated in the case of 
the Herero and Ovambo division in Namibia. People claim that their own 
traditions are historically justifiable but they are often rendered inflexible and 
exploited by the overarching rulers.
AFRICAN POTENTIALS: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH?
African Potentials are tentatively defined as the capabilities of Africans to 
resolve contradictions among the people, utilising indigenous knowledge on 
human relations that has constantly transformed and accumulated at the level 
of people’s everyday life (Moyo & Mine, 2016). The development of the art of 
conflict resolution and transformation has persisted throughout pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial times, and African Potentials can be reviewed in two 
dimensions related to space and time. However, a distinction ought to be made 
between personal (or direct) violence and structural (or indirect) violence (see 
Galtung, 1969).
When the military kills innocent civilians, that homicide is an act of personal 
violence. When rural children die of avoidable infectious diseases in the periphery 
of global capitalism, structural violence is committed; as the children’s potential 
to have a long life is crushed by external influence and structural poverty. 
Similarly, the infringement of food sovereignty of nations in the South that 
imposes avoidable starvation on people is a clear manifestation of structural 
violence. While structural violence is often accompanied by personal violence 
and vice versa, these two notions of violence should not be confused. Absence 
of personal violence and absence of structural violence are both desirable goals 
of global transformation, and the former is called “negative peace” while the 
latter is called “positive peace.”
The concept of structural violence illuminates the anti-human nature of poverty 
and exploitation, which are regarded here as a form of violence, even if they 
are caused by a system with no explicit intention of harming individuals; 
capitalists do not beat workers with their whips in person (Moyo & Mine, 2016). 
Polarisation of the world into the centre in which autocentric development is 
on track and the periphery in which disarticulation permeates economy and 
society, as well as unequal exchange embedded in the global trade system, does 
exist. However, it may not be visible unless we look at reality through the lens 
of a scientific theory of global capitalism (Amin, 1976). On the other hand, 
personal violence may function even without resorting to physical violence at 
all; a threat to use violence may suffice to fetter action on the part of the 
potential victims of violence. Exercise of personal violence may indeed trigger 
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a chain of grave violence (e.g., the role of Western nations in the Rwandan 
Genocide and the toppling Gaddafi in Libya in the name of responsibility to 
protect). This kind of violence precipitated personal violence in Maghreb, in the 
Sahel countries and in regions of Central Africa. The dichotomous world of 
centre-periphery is rife with both structural and personal violence, and Africa 
is in the line of fire.
While we define violence as the difference between the actual and the potential, 
the notion of African Potentials suggests further considerations. In an imaginary 
state in which both personal violence and structural violence are abolished, with 
the actual matching the potential, the actual shape of such an accomplished state 
remains vague. In terms of popular interpretation of human development, in 
such a state, all individuals would be able to enjoy longevity, a decent life, a 
good education with a fair distribution of resources. However, human potentials 
do not only cover the socio-economic well-being of individuals but are also 
closely tied to collective self-determination in the political and cultural spheres; 
the realization of national, communal and personal dignity is therefore essential. 
Given the diversity of value in use, a hypothetical society in which all potentials 
are realized will be substantially different from the average shape of homogeneous 
“global society.” Such hypothetical spaces will be diverse, given the wide variety 
of local and regional histories and belief systems, as well as the diversity present 
in ecological systems. This is the reason why we speak about “African” potentials 
rather than abstract human potentials.
However, a blanket notion of Africa is problematic, as Africa is extremely 
diverse, not only in terms of ecosystems, cultures, religions and languages but 
also with relation to economic structures and political systems. The unique 
position of the Southern African region suggests that its conflict regime is based 
on the history of foreign control over land and resources, testifying the glaring 
truth that primitive accumulation of capital is not just a one-off event but a 
sustained process. At the same time, the economic activities of monopoly 
capitalism have closely integrated the entire region, thereby making an agenda 
of the liberation of the whole region realistic.
Historically, Southern Africa has been a microcosm of global structural and 
personal violence, which has been consolidated by the legal and cultural 
superstructure of Euro-centric racism, as well as by sophisticated military 
machines targeting the whole region to protect the racial order of Apartheid. 
This historical path of agrarian accumulation in Southern Africa differs from the 
path travelled by the rest of the continent.
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND ACCUMULATION TRAJECTORIES IN 
AFRICA
Patterns of conflict over land and resources in Africa continue to be defined 
by the agrarian structures that have taken shape through the history of colonial 
scramble for Africa in the past centuries. Three macro-scale trajectories of capital 
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accumulation are discernible: first, the labour reserve political economies mainly 
in Southern Africa; second, the resource extraction concession enclaves mainly 
in Central Africa; third, the trade economies grounded on the extraction of 
surpluses from African peasantries across West and Eastern Africa (Amin, 1976). 
These diverse historical paths created intense but varied patterns of structural 
violence.
An “Africa of the labour reserves” emerged through land dispossession and 
displacement of the peasantry, which was conducive to monopolistic control 
over land and water resources as well as increased infrastructure investments 
for the benefit of white settlers. This plainly unequal structure is manifest in 
such places as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Kenya and Algeria on a large 
scale, as well as in their neighbours such as Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique 
on a smaller scale (Denoon, 1972; Magubane, 1979). This process clearly shifted 
the main producers of food from African peasants toward large-scale European 
farmers with the support of state marketing boards and European merchants. In 
addition, from the 1950s, new enclaves of highly subsidised agro-industrial 
estates were expanded in this region.
Even though the continuous process of land dispossession seriously undermined 
the livelihoods of African peasantry (almost completely in South Africa) and 
caused “land hunger,” this accumulation “from above” fell short of the total 
dispossession of peasant lands. Instead, based on a functional dualism that 
subjugated labour and repressed peasant farming, the process resulted in the 
creation and preservation of “labour reserves,” the homes of migrant workers 
who were exposed to super-exploitation. This settler mode of accumulation placed 
the burden of the social reproduction of cheap labour on the shoulders of 
peasantries in segregated “communal” areas, where “tribal” authority was 
preserved and recreated by the settler regime to regulate the systems (Moyo & 
Yeros, 2005). Today, domestic and foreign capitalist farmers seek to insert 
themselves into this arena through the mediation of chiefs and the state. This 
instrumentalisation of tradition and universal values (land and tenure) makes it 
imperative for us to discuss the ambiguity of the roles of traditional leaders in 
conceptualising African Potentials in Southern African contexts.
In an “Africa of the concessions,” several significant agricultural and mining 
enclaves were formed around plantations with rudimentary agro-processing 
facilities, typically in Central Africa. This entailed the plunder of raw material 
and limited infrastructural investments by trading and mining conglomerates. 
This mode of accumulation entailed direct control of the resources by transnational 
capital, rather than the creation of a domestic bourgeoisie based on the indigenous 
population or European settlers. Such enclaves were sustained only by the 
merciless use of personal violence: military control and forcible recruitment of 
cheap labour. The pedigree of resistance to this enclave dispossession, for instance 
in Cameroon, is well documented (Crowder, 1968). The enclaves were not 
directly integrated into local economic development, though after independence 
the creation and incorporation of peasantries started to supplement the 
enclaves, except where large oil and mining enclaves overshadowed national 
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policies.
In an “Africa of the économie de traite,” seemingly autonomous peasants are 
forced to produce a quota of specific export products. This practice was developed 
and sustained for two centuries of European mercantilism, typically in West and 
Eastern Africa. Although this mode of accumulation was also premised on the 
rule of “traditional” chiefs buttressed by colonial administration along the line 
of “indirect rule” of Lord Lugard, the difference from the first path is that 
peasants were encouraged to produce more on the land. This type of colonisation 
led to the pervasive growth of “petty (agricultural) commodity production” among 
increasingly differentiated peasantries (Bernstein, 2002) or “small cultivators” (Mafeje, 
2003). Critically, this mode of colonization also gave rise to institutionalised labour 
migration based on various extra-economic measures other than forceful land 
alienation.
In West Africa, a vast number of farmers migrated from northern territories 
into the coastal and forest areas where agricultural commercialisation was focused 
on tropical crop exports. In the end, this trajectory has been conducive not only 
to the creation of diverse peasantries but also to intense land conflict in places 
like today’s Côte d’Ivoire, where there have been attempts to deprive “alien 
northerners” of their entitlements. Even in the peasant societies of this third 
category, large-scale agricultural estates (e.g., palm oil) emerged from the 1940s 
and led to the creation of new enclaves as the drive to modernise agriculture 
grew.
The gradual transformation of the agro-based African political economy since 
the beginning of the 21st century and the prolonged crisis of the world capitalist 
system has produced a new wave of accumulation by land dispossession in 
Africa at large, partly through fraudulent land grabbing, as well as more generally 
through the erosion of both rural and urban incomes due to wage repression 
and price hikes, which brings social reproduction based in the African countryside 
into crisis (Moyo et al., 2013). The renewed interest in oil, gas and mineral 
extraction accompanies the most recent surge in land alienation, expanding the 
production of food, bio-fuels and natural resources for export at the expense of 
food sovereignty. The same process intensifies the exploitation of water resources 
and undermines the livelihoods of peasants and pastoralists.
Under present global neoliberal conditions, small and scattered forms of land 
concentration started to emerge in the 1990s even in non-settler Africa. This 
seems to have established a fragile merchant path of agrarian accumulation that 
involves non-rural capital gaining access to land. This accumulation path is now 
being overtaken by a wider process of large-scale land alienation led by both 
Western and Eastern foreign capital, often with African domestic allies. Although 
many “land deals” have not yet been confirmed, this uncertainty itself has fuelled 
political upheaval as occurred in Madagascar. This continental process of land 
and agrarian transformation is now installing a new “junker” path of accumulation 
across Africa, which is transforming parts of the African countryside to perform 
the function of impoverished labour reserves in parallel with the creation of 
more agricultural enclaves (Moyo et al., 2013).
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This trend seems to suggest a gradual convergence of the three macro 
accumulation trajectories, with agrarian capital and expertise from Southern 
Africa playing an important role in the scramble for land. The varied and yet 
converging accumulation trajectories continue to be at the heart of uneven 
development, exclusion and poverty in Africa. This process constitutes a key 
factor of the major conflicts and provokes widespread resistances throughout the 
continent. The radicalisation of Zimbabwe since 1997 is a case in point (Moyo, 
2008). The ongoing struggle for land in Southern Africa, therefore, has critical 
implications for the future of Africa as a whole.
AFRICAN POTENTIALS IN HISTORY
African Potentials should be considered in terms of both spatial and temporal 
dimensions, reflecting the continent’s integration into the space of world capitalist 
system, and its continued exposure to forms of severe personal and structural 
violence that centre around land and agrarian inequalities occasioned by different 
modes of European colonial penetration. Extending the time horizon a little 
further back to pre-colonial times enables us to “rediscover” the continuity of 
African agency. While going along with the “reinvention” of traditions thesis, we 
ought not to romanticise the African past. Nonetheless, elements of past practices 
for possible conflict resolution did not die out but persist into today’s Africa, 
even though such potentials have been constrained by colonial and post-colonial 
politics.
Multifarious African societies have been consolidated into a larger polity 
that might face serious fission again, rendering the overall shape of African 
society extremely amorphous. There has not been a linear development of 
homogeneous “tribes” in Africa but a continuous rise and decline of 
heterogeneous societies and polities. Therefore, African “traditional” societies 
have largely been characterised by mobility, fluidity, flexibility and openness.
These traits of African societies seem to have affected the modalities of 
resolving everyday micro conflicts pertaining to the allocation of land and 
resources, succession struggles, family feuds, homicides, and skirmishes with 
neighbouring societies over livestock and so forth. In such a fluid and flexible 
society, boundaries of identities tend to be blurred; a person may keep dual 
ethnic identification with both the original community and the present settlement, 
switch over between them, or create a new identity platform. People often 
patiently let time pass before an implicit consensus is reached among diverse 
members by means of egalitarian, horizontal communication, sometimes called 
Palaver (see Neocosmos, 2016). Innovations brought by outsiders are experimented 
selectively before they take root as “indigenous.” Traditional rituals to heal the 
wounds of society are constantly reworked to accommodate the needs of the 
present moment.
As evidenced in the new resettlement areas after the land reform of Zimbabwe, 
people with diverse backgrounds make use of marriage, burials, totemic ties, 
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chief’s authority and other traditional and modern tools to redefine the notion 
of autochthony and create a new sense of belonging (Mkodzongi, 2016). In the 
countryside facing land grabbing, the collective will of villagers prevails and 
effectively checks the undemocratic deviation of traditional leaders. Although 
some colonial scholars have marvelled at the sophistication of African 
contemporary practices and even attempted to codify them (Schapera, 1938), the 
modalities of conflict resolution and transformation have always been changeable 
and of an ad-hoc nature in the African peasant world. The experience of South 
Africa’s TRC demonstrates the power of undetermined, open ventures aimed at 
social healing in Africa.
However, these historically rooted practices have been neglected, distorted 
and manipulated by colonial administrators, and then, by authoritarian rulers of 
African states after independence. Today, the relative fluidity of frontiers is 
making African societies vulnerable to larger-scale conflicts. The institutional 
vacuum in the periphery of existing nation-states sometimes serves as the 
hotbed of predatory militant groups, as well as the stage of large-scale land 
grabbing by global and domestic capital, thereby forcing African peasants to 
face insecurity over land more than ever before. On the other hand, cages 
of “modern nations” grafted to onto African soil are giving rise to hierarchical 
regimes of citizenship and belonging, thereby stoking xenophobic violence, 
ironically, in the regional centres of capital accumulation such as the African 
champion of “liberal democracy,” South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 
2006).
As eloquently described by Frantz Fanon, in the colonial extremity of the 
dichotomy of absolute good and absolute evil, violence exerted by the colonised 
would function as a necessary momentum to liberate them. However, Fanon 
also believed that such cleansing violence of the masses should be given an 
appropriate direction by a dedicated leadership that would be willing to work 
among them. While engaging in the Algerian liberation struggle, he clearly 
foresaw the rule of a neo-colonial “national bourgeoisie” in independent African 
states and their hostility to the peasant majority (Fanon, 2004). This alienation 
seems to have cast a long shadow over contemporary African politics.
Categorising post-colonial African states, Thandika Mkandawire (2008) 
forcefully argued that the “rentier” states that depend on rents from the mining 
sector have been more prone to violent conflicts than the “merchant” states that 
rely on the taxation of peasants. In the former, the wealth tends to concentrate 
in economic enclaves and cities. Extreme forms of rising inequalities, which are 
becoming all the more visible today, thrusted the frustrated urban youth into 
radical and yet ideologically premature rebellion. Then, after being defeated, some 
of these groups were pushed out of the capital cities, roving and seeking support 
in the countryside, where they encountered indifference and even hostility among 
local peasants, whose worldviews were largely unfamiliar to the young rebels. 
This is considered a major factor behind the atrocities in the countryside, committed 
by the revolutionaries-turned-rogues who desperately tried to “capture” the peasantry 
in West and Central Africa (Mkandawire, 2008). It must be noted that the 
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possibility of repetition of this type of conflict is becoming real, given the 
convergence of accumulation trajectories with the creation of more enclaves in 
many more African countries.
The antagonism between the urban and the rural spaces in Africa brings home 
the importance of learning from everyday practices for settling disputes and 
transforming conflicts in the world of the peasantry as a part of our collective 
endeavours to release historically grounded African Potentials. The modalities 
of micro practices of conflict resolution in the countryside, which have developed 
in African historical settings, should be nurtured carefully so that lessons can 
be adapted to other communities, including the space of urban dwellers, through 
mutual learning. African Potentials ought to address both personal and structural 
violence by connecting micro village practices with a larger attempt at structural 
transformation, so as to put an end to capitalist exploitation and super-exploitation 
and bring about the co-existence and flourishing of multiple communities in 
Africa.
Our book on African Potentials in the context of Southern Africa presents a 
powerful set of case studies that sheds light on various aspects of people’s 
experiences with conflict resolution and transformation on the ground, avoiding 
the hasty generalisation and formalisation of such cases (Moyo & Mine, 2016).
CONCLUSION: FUTURE COLLABORATION WITH REGARD TO 
AFRICAN POTENTIALS
The “African Potentials” Forums have certainly led to a variety of productive 
intellectual exchanges not only around the notion of African Potentials but also 
in terms of provoking discussion on epistemological issues and raising questions 
on the practical challenges of knowledge production in Africa with a global 
intellectual context. The Forums have initiated an opening up of many participants 
to the varied paradigmatic and intellectual practices of non-Western scholarship. 
There has been a widening of the research and learning vistas for many of those 
involved, as well as the creation of a space for imagining alternative ways of 
thinking about Africa’s social and political transformations.
The “African Potentials” Forums have also been accompanied by other forms 
of academic collaboration between Japanese and African network members. This 
includes the inception of new forms of joint training of post-graduate students, 
various research exchange visits, the initiation of book publication projects, and 
the promotion of new publishing fora.
The scope for further deepening these intellectual spaces, exchanges and 
networking is substantial, but the potential is yet to be fully realised. The 
investments made so far in the African Potentials Network need to be leveraged 
immediately in order to broaden their impact on the autonomous and innovative 
intellectual projects ongoing among African and Japanese scholars and students.
The key initiatives that this combined Forum may consider for further discussion 
include how to:
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1) Establish new ways of strengthening the current networking system, 
including the reinforcement of key member nodes to enhance intellectual 
research and training within Africa;
2) Support wider African publishing institutions and new publishing 
practices, including increasing the translation of works by various network 
members;
3) Establish and institutionalize a systematic research programme with 
specified themes over a long-term period (i.e., five years and beyond);
4) Develop a more structured and broader-based joint PhD training and 
scholarship programme in Japan and Africa;
5) Link and broaden the African Potentials network to connect with other 
existing South-South and Pan-African networks which members of the 
Forum are part of; and
6) Imagine new, feasible and adaptive ways of financing autonomous 
intellectual spaces in Africa and Japan.
NOTE
(1) The project website is: http://www.africapotential.africa.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/index.html. 
The second phase of the project was launched in April 2016: http://www.africapotential.
africa.kyoto-u.ac.jp/mms/en/.
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